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ABSTRACT 
As we build increasingly large scale systems (and systems 
of systems), the level of complexity is also rising. We still 
expect people to intervene when things go wrong, however, 
and to diagnose and fix the problems. Aviation has a history 
of developing systems with a very good safety record. 
Domains such as high frequency trading (HFT), however, 
have a much more chequered history. We note that there are 
several parallels that can be drawn between aviation and 
HFT. We highlight the ironies of automation that apply to 
HFT, before going on to identify several lessons that have 
been used to improve safety in aviation and show how they 
can be applied to increase the resilience of HFT in 
particular. 
Author Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are building ever larger scale IT based systems (and 
systems of systems) and these systems now permeate much 
of society. Many of these systems incorporate levels of 
complexity that make it difficult for an individual to get a 
good understanding of how they really work. Recent 
advances allow the technology to achieve levels of 
99.999% reliability. These systems are invariably socio-
technical systems, operated by teams of people, and we 
expect people to intervene and save the day when the 
technology fails. 
This situation has persisted since we started introducing 
technology into the workplace. It is now 30 years since 
Bainbridge [2] published her paper “Ironies of Automation” 
which analysed the basic irony that as control systems get 
more advanced, the contribution of the human operator 
seems to become more important. Bainbridge’s work 
predates many significant technological developments—
distributed systems, personal computers, the advent of the 
Internet and so on. We are still not giving the operators the 
resources to fulfil their role, so the ironies of automation 
still prevail, and we can still learn from the underlying 
arguments, which are all founded in psychology [4].  
The characteristics of aviation and the process 
industries 
Bainbridge focused her attention on monitoring and control 
activities in the process industries (chemical production, 
steel manufacturing and so on), and aviation to illustrate the 
problems. These domains are characterised by being 
complex and highly dynamic. Although it may be possible 
(in some cases, at least) to still manually control the 
processes involved, automation is almost invariably 
involved. The automation that is used, however, is not 
always transparent or predictable, which can give rise to 
automation surprises [35] where the operator’s start to ask 
questions such as “Why did it do that?” and “What is it 
doing now?” Indeed, the need to oversee the automation is 
probably best exemplified by aviation. To achieve the 
appropriate levels of skill required to fly an aircraft with its 
vast array of instrument displays, dials, switches and levers 
in the cockpit, pilots were typically taught that they had to 
aviate, navigate and communicate. The advent of the glass 
cockpit, where the functionality of many devices was 
incorporated into computer systems changed the nature of 
the job of flying an aircraft such that pilots are now taught 
to aviate, communicate and manage systems.  
The changes in technology across complex, dynamic 
domains changed the role of the operator from one of 
manual control, to one of monitoring and supervisory 
control. The net effect is that people have become less 
directly involved in controlling processes as tasks have 
been automated.  
At the point where automation started to become more 
widespread, many systems designers regarded the operators 
as a major source of variation and unpredictability in 
system performance. Their solution was to automate tasks 
and essentially remove the human operators from the 
system. This was in contradiction to the body of evidence 
showing the importance of the interdependencies between 
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people and technology and how these are intrinsic to getting 
work done [e.g., 11, 13]. 
In most domains where systems are safety critical there are 
constraints and bottlenecks on how the system is allowed to 
perform. In process control, for example, the laws of 
chemistry and physics constrain how quickly some 
processes can happen, and in aviation, airports only have a 
limited number of runways, so a scheduling mechanism is 
used to maintain an efficient throughput of aircraft. The 
systems have checks and balances in place to assure safety 
to a very high level.  
From aviation to financial trading 
In the 30 years since Bainbridge published her work, 
technology has become ubiquitous. In some domains, such 
as financial trading, technology now pervades where it 
never existed before.  
For hundreds of years, financial trading was a largely low-
tech human activity, involving buying and selling face-to-
face on “open-outcry” trading floors (and originally in 
London’s coffee shops) using little more technology than a 
pencil and paper. Then, on October 27th, 1986, the “Big 
Bang” deregulation of UK financial markets [e.g., 7] 
ushered in a move from open-outcry to screen based 
electronic trading on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
For the first time, geographically dispersed traders could 
now trade en masse from separate financial institutions. 
New, anonymous computer-based trading platforms 
enabled faster transaction speeds, better price discovery and 
increased liquidity. The markets flourished and huge profits 
were made. Trading technology was here to stay.  
Although financial trading may seem a far cry from 
domains like aviation, and industrial process control, there 
are similarities. In some ways markets can be likened to 
airspace. In airspace, there are multiple airlines interacting 
and competing for the best slots to make money, whilst in 
the financial markets there is intense competition between 
high frequency traders looking to exploit fleeting arbitrage 
opportunities to make money. Each aircraft that flies 
through the airspace is monitored and controlled by human 
pilots whilst each trading algorithm deployed in electronic 
markets is also monitored and, to a lesser extent, controlled 
by human traders. In aviation there are regulations that try 
to ensure safety and efficiency, whilst still providing an 
environment in which the airlines can make money; in the 
markets there are also regulations in place to try to make 
sure that markets achieve efficiency and resilience, whilst 
allowing trading companies to make money [19]. 
In the past three years there have been several highly visible 
failures in financial trading. In the next section we detail 
one particular type of trading, high frequency trading 
(HFT), focusing on three significant failures in financial 
trading, to indicate the types of problems and the issues 
involved in HFT. We then describe the results that came out 
of the UK Foresight project which examined the future of 
automated trading in financial markets.  This is followed by 
a consideration of more human factors related issues, 
describing the ironies of automation as they apply to 
financial trading. After looking at the lessons that HFT can 
learn from aviation, we conclude by re-emphasising the 
need to consider financial trading in the markets as a socio-
technical system, learning lessons from other domains 
where similar problems have already been resolved.  
HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 
In traditional financial markets, the success of a trader 
depended on their making timely decisions. These were 
based on their knowledge of market fundamentals and 
dynamics, and knowing when to continue to hold a 
particular position and when to get out. There is invariably 
a lot of information flowing in the markets, so it has always 
been difficult for a lone individual to successfully monitor 
and anticipate events, rather than just react to them as they 
happen.  
After 1986’s Big Bang, further deregulation and 
technological innovation combined to radically change the 
landscape of financial trading beyond all recognition. 
Accelerated by the EU’s 2007 Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID)1, there has been a 
proliferation of Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), 
including Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and 
Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), enabling 
trading to take place away from the traditional exchanges. 
This has produced market fragmentation. 
The introduction of technology made it possible to monitor 
larger amounts of information more quickly than people 
can, and provided the foundation for algorithmic and 
automated trading systems. These systems use software to 
automate some (and sometimes all) of the trading process. 
They were developed to assist and, in many cases, replace 
human traders. These systems allow decisions about buying 
and selling to be made more quickly (and automatically) to 
exploit fluctuations in markets and individual prices.  
At the extreme end of automated trading lie HFT systems 
that habitually trade relatively small quantities of stocks and 
shares, often only holding positions for a fraction of a 
second. If the system can generate a net profit of a few 
pennies in that time, this can quickly lead to a steady stream 
of income by carrying out a large number of similar trades.  
HFT systems are designed to exploit fleeting arbitrage 
opportunities that arise between market venues. Their main 
strategy depends on speed of execution: if another trader 
manages to execute first, an opportunity will often be lost. 
This competition has produced a race to zero [19] among 
HFTs as they try to minimise latency at all costs. 
                                                           
1 MiFID was proposed to offer new opportunities and 
innovation, but few anticipated how dramatically it would 
alter the landscape. 
Consequently, HFTs utilise relatively simple/naïve 
strategies, because they cannot afford the time required to 
perform a series of complex calculations before they act. 
In order to minimise the time it takes to execute, automatic 
trading systems are normally situated on servers that are 
physically located as close as possible to the digital stock 
exchange. 
The majority of financial trading is now automated. It has 
been estimated that in the US markets HFT could yield an 
annual income of at least of the order of $10bn [23], 
although this is currently quite small compared to the 
overall trading volume (which was about $50 trillion in 
2008). 
Whilst the human traders have not completely disappeared, 
they may now be based in offices situated across the globe. 
The role of the human trader, however, has been reduced in 
the same way as has happened in process control and 
aviation where the operators and pilots are now less directly 
involved in performing control actions. Nowadays traders 
are mainly concerned with setting trading strategies and 
monitoring their execution. Even in the relatively rare 
situations where the humans are still making decisions, the 
trades are still executed algorithmically. It is a fiercely 
competitive world, however, and in the time it takes a trade 
to execute, there is a risk that another algorithm may have 
identified that the trade is happening and intervene before 
the trade completes to make its own profit.  
The naivety of HFTs combined with their immensely fast 
trading times can have profound effects. Here we describe 
three events to illustrate the deleterious dynamics that HFT 
can cause in the financial markets. These examples vary in 
scale of interaction between HFT firms: from the micro-
level behaviour of an individual firm (Knight Capital’s 
“technology breakdown”); the mid-level interaction 
between HFTs in an individual stock (stock price 
“fractures”); and the macro-level multi-instrument, market-
wide interactions (the “flash crash”). It is interesting to note 
that all of the events we describe bear the elements of the 
aviation automation surprises we described earlier. 
Knight Capital’s “Technology Breakdown” 
The Knight Capital Group is an American global financial 
services firm engaging in market making,2 electronic 
execution, and institutional sales and trading. In 2011, 
Knight ranked number 1 in secondary trading of US 
equities by share volume among all securities firms; and in 
                                                           
2 Market makers provide liquidity to a market by issuing 
simultaneous quotes to buy and sell a financial instrument 
or commodity, with the hope of making a profit on the bid-
ask spread: the difference between the buy and sell price. 
the first three quarters of 2012 Knight’s US Equity Market 
Making traded an average of 128,000 shares per second.3  
On 1st August 2012, Knight Capital started live trading 
using their new Retail Liquidity Provider (RLP) market 
making software on the NYSE. Immediately they started 
losing millions of dollars a minute. It was forty-five 
minutes before the software was stopped, by which point 
Knight had lost a total of $440 million [20]. The following 
day Knight’s own share price plummeted on the news, 
erasing 75% of Knight’s equity value. Within six months, a 
rescue deal was put together by a group of Wall Street firms 
to prevent Knight having to file for bankruptcy. The 
downfall of this highly successful HFT firm was entirely 
due to one disastrous autonomous technology breakdown.   
While doubt remains as to the exact cause of Knight’s 
trading loss, Nanex Research’s [28] analysis offers the most 
compelling insight. By forensically analyzing millisecond 
trade data on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
Nanex Research demonstrated that there was a frenetic 
period where almost all trades alternated between buying at 
the offer (the lowest price offered by a seller) and then 
immediately selling at the bid (the highest price offered by 
a buyer), each time losing the difference in the bid-ask 
spread. “In the case of EXC [Excelon Corporation], that 
means losing about 15 cents on every pair of trades. Do that 
40 times a second, 2400 times a minute, and you now have 
a system that’s very efficient at burning money” [28]. It 
appears that Knight had inadvertently deployed their test 
software as well as RLP!  
The test software was designed to fire patterns of buy and 
sell orders at RLP inside a development platform, but was 
now doing just that on the live exchange using real money. 
Neither the traders at Knight, nor the RLP had any idea that 
anything was wrong because the test software was not 
designed to feedback any information about profit and loss. 
The two separate units of Knight software were both buying 
and selling without any idea of what the other was doing 
[28].  
Alternative explanations for Knight’s trading loss include 
the suggestion that the trading malfunction involved Knight 
Capital buying $5 billion of stock in a trade that was 
intended to take place over five weeks but was actually 
executed in just 20 minutes [12]. Whatever the ultimate 
actual cause of Knight’s loss, one thing is certain: in the 
time it took for the HFT system’s error to be spotted and the 
algorithm pulled, it was already far too late for the firm to 
recover from the devastating consequences.  
Stock Price “Fractures” 
In February 2012, Johnson et al. [22] published a working 
paper that immediately received widespread media 
attention, including coverage in eFinancial-News [33], New 
                                                           
3 http://www.knight.com/ourfirm/liquidity.asp 
Scientist [17] and Wired [24]. Having analysed 
millisecond-by-millisecond stock-price movements 
between 2006 and 2011, Johnson et al. argued that there 
was evidence for a phase transition in the behaviour of 
financial markets at the sub-second time-scale. At the point 
of this transition, the market dynamics switch from a 
domain involving interactions among a mix of human 
traders and robot automated algorithmic trading systems, to 
a domain newly-identified by Johnson et al. in which the 
automated trading systems interact only among themselves, 
with no human traders involved. This abrupt system-wide 
transition from mixed human-algorithm phase to a new all-
algorithm phase has been named the “robot phase 
transition” [5]. 
At sub-second timescales, below the robot transition, the 
robot-only market exhibits “fractures”–ultra-fast swings in 
price–that are undesirable, little understood, and 
intriguingly appear to be linked to longer-term instability of 
the market as a whole. In particular, Johnson et al. [22] 
showed that the cumulative number of fractures observed 
across the entire market increased sharply during the period 
that the S&P500 fell most rapidly. Subsequently, as the 
index began to recover, fewer fractures were observed. This 
discovery has the potential for significant impact in the 
global financial markets. If the short-term micro-effects can 
indeed give some indication of longer-term macro-scale 
behaviour then it is possible that new methods for 
monitoring the stability of markets could be developed, 
offering early-warning systems for future flash-crashes. We 
return to this point in the discussion on ex post circuit 
breakers in the discussion of the findings of the Foresight 
report. 
In March 2012, a series of laboratory-style experiments 
where human traders interacted with algorithmic trading 
agents (i.e., robots) in a minimal experimental model of an 
electronic financial exchange were conducted [5]. The aim 
was to see if correlates of the two regimes suggested by 
Johnson et al. occur in such laboratory conditions. Results 
indicated that when trading robots act on a super-human 
timescale of 100ms,4 the market starts to fragment, with 
statistically fewer human-robot interactions that we would 
expect from a fully mixed market. In contrast, when robotic 
trader agents are slowed to a thinking-and-reaction speed 
similar to that of humans (of the order of hundreds of 
milliseconds, up to 10000ms), less fragmentation is 
observed. Cartlidge and Cliff [5] conclude that this is the 
first evidence for the robot transition occurring in controlled 
experimental financial market systems. This discovery and 
methodology opens the way for a principled research 
program to dynamically study the inter-relationships 
between the low level behaviour of automated trading 
                                                           
4 The fastest robots were set to “wake” 100ms after a new 
market stimulus. This is quicker than a human is able to 
respond to a simple signal. 
systems and the global impact they have on market 
stability. Interestingly, an inadvertently introduced “spread 
jumping” bug that caused the robot agents to trade at prices 
far from equilibrium was introduced in the initial round of 
experiments. Despite the relative simplicity of the market, 
the bug (which had interesting parallels with the Knight 
Capital bug) was not spotted in real-time and was only 
discovered through extensive post-experimental analysis 
[5]. 
The “Flash Crash” 
The Flash Crash happened in the USA on May 6th, 2010. 
The US’s Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (aka “the 
Dow”) was down by over 300 points on the day, but then 
fell a further 600 points between in the five minutes 
between 14:42 and 14:47, effectively wiping $1 trillion 
from the value of the market. In the subsequent 20-minute 
period, the Dow recovered most of the 600-point fall. The 
Flash Crash was the largest within day fall on the index but, 
perhaps more importantly, it was the unprecedented speed 
at which the crash occurred that was truly stunning.  
That crashes occur in financial markets is self-evident. 
However, the nature of crashes, in particular the speed of 
crashes, has changed over time as technology has been 
introduced. For instance, in 1929, the well-documented 
Wall Street Crash was the tipping point that plunged the 
Western world into economic depression [16]. On “Black 
Thursday”, Oct 24th 1929, decades before the invention of 
the digital computer, the Dow opened at 305.85. By Nov 
13th, it had fallen to 199; a 35% decrease in market value in 
just 3 weeks. Five decades later, on Oct 19th 1987, when 
electronic trading systems and computer-generated trading 
were still in their infancy, “Black Monday” saw the largest 
one-day decline in the Dow’s history (22%).  The Flash 
Crash of May 6th 2010, in comparison, saw the Dow 
plummet 9% and then largely recover in the space of just 20 
minutes. Clearly, as technology pervades, and markets 
become more dynamic, market crashes can occur at ever-
greater speeds.  
It was not just the speed of the flash crash that raised 
concern. This was a new kind of crash that had dynamics 
previously unseen. For instance, within the space of 14 
seconds, more than 27,000 E-Mini S&P futures contracts 
were bought and sold; yet the aggregate net purchases was a 
mere 200. Ultra-fast algorithms had simply been passing 
contracts back and forth between themselves at lightning 
speed in what was described as a hot potato effect. 
Contemporaneous with the Dow’s Flash Crash, individual 
stock prices behaved extremely erratically. Some stocks, 
like Accenture, plummeted to just 1 cent, while others, such 
as Sotheby’s, traded at $100,000. At this value, Sotheby’s 
had a net worth greater than the entire Chinese GDP! To 
compensate, the NYSE retrospectively cancelled all trades 
executed between 14:40-15:00 that were more than 60% 
away from last print at 14:40. This arbitrary cut-off point 
resulted in lots of arbitrary winners but, more importantly, 
lots of arbitrary losers. Trade dynamics such as these and 
the resulting ad-hoc interventions severely damaged 
investor confidence. Traders are much less likely to invest 
in a company’s stock if they cannot be sure whether the 
share price in 10 minutes will be 1 cent or $100,000; or if 
the exchange is likely to cancel trades after the deal has 
been made.  
Furthermore, the Flash Crash has turned out to be a far from 
isolated incident. Since the Flash Crash, there have been 
repeated mini-flash crashes all over the world, such as the 
commodities crash of May 5th, 2011, where Brent Crude Oil 
suffered a record intraday 13% drop, Copper slid 5%, and 
Cotton fell 8% [34]. 
After 2010’s Flash Crash, it took the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) almost five months to publish 
its official report [6]. They attributed the event to Waddell 
& Reed’s large mutual fund selling an extraordinarily large 
number (75,000) of E-mini S&P contracts which exhausted 
the number of available buyers. This was followed by HFTs 
aggressively selling, thereby exacerbating the effects of the 
large sale, and contributing to the sharp fall in prices. In 
other words, the CFTC/SEC blamed a combination of fat 
fingers (a trader hitting the wrong button) and HFTs. 
The CFTC/SEC report has been widely condemned for its 
explanation of events. Nanex [29], for example, 
conclusively showed using millisecond tick data that the 
Waddell & Reed algorithm “was very well behaved; it was 
careful not to impact the market by selling at the bid, for 
example”. In simple terms, this means that the Waddell & 
Reed algorithm waited for buyers to accept its selling price 
each time it sold, rather than (as the CFTC/SEC suggested) 
aggressively dumping stock into the market at any price it 
could take. The mutual fund’s algorithm will have had 
some influence on the market, however, as it was targeting 
volume in its strategy [36]. Also, the claim that somebody 
inadvertently sold more stock in Proctor & Gamble than 
intended has been refuted, and the role of HFTs remains a 
matter of contention. Several alternative explanations for 
the Flash Crash have been advanced. Some are still the 
subject of debate, such as whether Waddle & Reed’s 
massive sale of 75,000 E-mini S&P contracts led to a major 
dislocation in the futures market too. 
What is clear, however, is that prices only stabilised when 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Stop Logic 
Functionality was triggered to prevent a cascade of further 
falls in the price of E-mini S&P contracts. This injected a 
five second pause in trading, which was accompanied by a 
reduction in market pressures. A short time later, the price 
of the E-mini contracts began to recover, along with the 
Dow. 
In the USA, trading curbs, known as circuit breakers, were 
subsequently introduced. These are designed to halt trading 
in any S&P 500 stock that fluctuates up or down by more 
than 10% within a five minute period. On the day of the 
Flash Crash, the process for breaking a trade was not clear 
to those traders in the market, and trades were only being 
halted when they were over 60% away from the reference 
price. 
These new circuit breakers, which halt trade to provide a 
five-minute cooling off period, were initially only 
introduced for the S&P 500 stocks listed on the NYSE. 
They have subsequently been extended to other areas of the 
market, using trigger levels appropriate to that market. 
Although the circuit breakers may prevent re-occurrence of 
an identical Flash Crash, they do not eliminate the risk of 
other sorts of crashes, such as a Splash Crash, where a stock 
market event splashes out into the currency markets and 
beyond. This could happen because of the intricate 
interconnections between trades across markets as people 
try to keep their trading portfolio risk neutral by balancing 
it across sectors, markets, asset classes and so on [18]. 
FORESIGHT ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE OF 
COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
A proposal to establish a project to look at the future of 
computer based trading in global financial markets was 
made in early 2010, before the Flash Crash (Cliff, personal 
communication). The UK Government Office for Science’s 
subsequently commissioned an international Foresight 
Project on The Future of Computer Trading in Financial 
Markets to look at two major challenges. The first was to 
explore the effects of the pace of technological change 
which, coupled to the continual rise in complexity of 
financial trading and markets makes it problematic to 
understand the role of HFT (and automated trading in 
general) on financial markets. The second was to create 
good evidence and sound analysis of the issues as a basis 
for informing the development of new regulations for the 
market. 
After two years of extensive examination of evidence from 
over 20 countries, the final report was published in October 
2012 [15]. The report explores how computer generated 
trading in financial markets will evolve over the next 10 
years, using independent academic analysis of the evidence 
on the actual and potential effects of computer-based 
trading on financial markets.  
Computer trading has transformed the way financial 
markets operate. Today, over one-third of UK based equity 
trading is HFT. In the US it may be as high as 60% or more. 
HFT has been implicated by some as a contributory factor 
in the Flash Crash, and in other failures as noted above.  
The Foresight project found evidence that computer based 
trading and HFT has had several beneficial effects on 
financial markets. Firstly, there has been a positive 
contribution to liquidity, as measured by bid-ask spreads: 
the difference between the lowest price a trader is willing to 
sell and the highest price a trader is willing to buy. 
Secondly, due to increased market venue competition and 
greater liquidity, transaction costs for both retail and 
institutional investors have reduced. Finally, there is no 
direct evidence that computer based trading and HFT has 
increased volatility or market abuse.  
In specific circumstances such as the Flash Crash, however, 
it was noted that HFT can have negative effects on the 
markets. In periods of uncertainty the need for liquidity, 
which is one of the roles of the market makers, can be 
critical. HFT market makers, however, tend to leave the 
market, leading to a disappearance of liquidity, making the 
situation even more uncertain [36]. Furthermore, self-
reinforcing feedback loops can amplify risks and lead to 
financial instability. The Foresight report proposes that 
mechanisms for managing and modifying potential adverse 
effects of computer based trading and HFT should be 
assessed and introduced. The mechanisms with the 
strongest supporting evidence and weakest opposing 
evidence include: (i) the introduction of coordinated circuit 
breakers; (ii) a coordination of tick sizes across venues; and 
(iii) market wide standards including coordinated, 
synchronized and accurate timestamps across multiple 
trading venues.  
Co-ordinated Circuit Breakers 
Circuit breakers are designed to temporarily halt trading, 
thus attempting to restore order in the market by dampening 
feedback loops to reduce further adverse movement. The 
breakers can be implemented in two ways: ex post and ex 
ante. Ex post circuit breakers trigger when a share price has 
fluctuated above or below a predefined safe threshold. 
These mechanisms monitor simple price data and activate 
only after the share price has moved out of bounds.  
In contrast, ex ante circuit breakers are designed to halt 
trading before things go bad. These preventative measures 
use metrics other than price to monitor the market for 
precursory indications that instability is more likely to 
occur. Such circuit breakers can then warn regulators, 
venues and participants in advance to take appropriate 
action. One such metric is Easley et al.’s [10] Volume-
synchronised Probability of Informed trading (VPIN™) 
flow toxicity metric. VPIN provides an estimate of the 
probability of informed trading based on volume imbalance 
and trade intensity. The value of VPIN was extremely high 
(suggesting low liquidity) in the run up to the Flash Crash. 
Easley et al. suggest that VPIN could be used: (i) as an ex 
ante indicator to warn about impending volatility/crashes; 
and (ii) as a tradable index (like the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Market Volatility Index, VIX™) to enable HFT 
firms (liquidity providers) to hedge their risk as VPIN 
accumulates before a crash.  
Irrespective of whether circuit breakers are ex ante or ex 
post, it is critical that they are harmonized across trading 
venues. If they are not, traders could simply switch to 
another trading venue when one venue gets halted. 
Co-ordinated Tick Sizes  
The tick size is the smallest price increment allowable at a 
trading venue. For instance, if the tick size is 10 cents and 
the current best bid (highest offer to buy) is €4.50, then the 
minimum price a buy order can have to post a new best bid 
is €4.60. Hence, the smaller the tick size, the easier it is (the 
more opportunities there are) to narrow the spread; i.e., to 
place a new buy order that is higher than the current best 
bid or a sell order that is lower than the current best ask. 
Smaller tick sizes offer more trading flexibility and are thus 
very attractive to HFT. For this reason, competition 
between trading venues to encourage HFT participation has 
led to an arms race between venues offering ever-smaller 
tick sizes.  
Identifying the right tick size involves making a trade-off 
between two opposing forces, however. On the one hand, a 
coarser grained tick size offers more incentive for investors 
to place limit orders—orders to buy and sell at a limit price, 
i.e., buy at the limit price or lower, or sell at the limit price 
or higher—thereby boosting the liquidity displayed in a 
limit order book [1]. The coarser tick leads to a wider 
minimum bid-ask spread. This makes market making more 
attractive by increasing its profitability, which should 
increase liquidity as the number of market makers rises. On 
the other hand, higher minimum bid-ask spreads raise 
investors’ transactions costs, which leads to reduced trading 
and a corresponding reduction in liquidity.  
As with circuit breakers, the Foresight report suggests that 
there should be a policy to harmonize the tick size across 
venues. If they are not, traders could simply switch venues 
with smaller tick sizes to reduce costs. 
Co-ordinated Market-Wide Standards 
The Foresight report makes the case for market-wide 
standards. These include the need for coordinated, 
synchronized and accurate timestamps across multiple 
trading venues. 
In addition the report notes the need for accurate, reliable 
data in order to better understand the effects of computer 
based and HFT and hopefully also prevent further adverse 
events. It therefore calls for the introduction of a European 
financial datacenter. This would be responsible for 
receiving, warehousing and repurposing financial data 
across all primary European markets. 
THE IRONIES OF AUTOMATION IN FINANCIAL 
TRADING 
As in other domains, automation has changed the role of the 
human (traders), leaving them with two main types of task. 
The first is to configure algorithms, monitor trades and 
evaluate results. The real problem here is that it typically 
takes a human about 150-200ms to respond to a simple 
stimulus such as a sound or a light. Given that the lower 
limit for trade execution times is currently around 10µs 
[19], this means that the system could have made tens of 
thousands more trades before the trader can respond.  
The traders’ skills for controlling how trades take place are 
likely to be out of date as a combination of erosion through 
lack of practice and changes in the nature of trading across 
several exchanges. Given that the trading systems are most 
likely to fail in unexpected situations, the traders may have 
to perform specialised, rarely (and possibly never before) 
used actions to regain control. In other words, the operators 
require more skill and need time and resources in order to 
work out what to do, possibly from first principles.  
The second type of task is diagnosing problems with the 
systems, and determining how to fix them. This is 
particularly important, given that other systems will attempt 
to exploit these problems to generate a profit. Diagnosing 
and fixing the problems requires a combination of cognitive 
skills, which Bainbridge [2] categorised as long term 
knowledge and working storage. As long as the traders have 
a detailed, up to date understanding of the systems they are 
controlling they may be able to develop novel strategies to 
deal with new situations as they arise. The context in which 
the traders make decisions will be encapsulated in a mental 
model [26], which is updated as the situation changes. 
Since the traders are usually no longer involved in 
controlling the trades, however, it becomes harder both to 
develop and maintain their mental models, and the less they 
use their knowledge, the harder it becomes to retrieve. So 
any interventions will often be based on a minimal amount 
of information until they have had the chance to investigate 
further, to update their mental model, and to consider the 
available options.  
If the traders are reduced to simply monitoring what the 
systems are doing, this creates another type of problem. For 
the most part, and under normal market conditions, the 
system will run smoothly and predictably. When the 
information the traders are watching is more or less 
unchanging, however, they are likely to have problems 
maintaining visual attention for more than 30 minutes. As 
their visual attention fades, it becomes harder to detect any 
visual anomalies. Automated alarms may help, but then the 
issue of who monitors the alarms arises. One of the classic 
ironies of automation is that the human has to monitor the 
system to make sure that it is working correctly, when the 
whole point of introducing the automation was because it 
was believed that it would do a better job than the human. 
Having the traders monitor the automation introduces two 
problems. 
The first is that the trader will require specialised 
knowledge—acquired through either training, or dedicated 
displays—in order to be able to monitor the system 
effectively. The second is that the systems are processing 
more information at a faster rate than the traders can in 
order to make decisions. It therefore becomes impossible 
for the trader to adequately track the system’s behaviour in 
real time. Instead, they will only be able to check the 
system at a higher level of abstraction and at a potentially 
considerable time lag. 
LESSONS FOR HFT FROM AVIATION  
The ironies of automation in financial trading can be 
overcome, but the solutions—like those for other domains 
such as aviation—are, as Bainbridge [2] acknowledged, 
highly dependent on factors such as the size, complexity 
and speed of the system. We believe that HFT, where the 
solutions are dependent on the trader’s skills and abilities, 
can learn something from aviation, in particular. Somewhat 
ironically, several of the solutions are technology based. 
We fully accept, however, that HFT should not just blindly 
follow aviation and that great care is needed in finding 
appropriate lessons and applying them. We are aware of the 
shortcomings of following checklists, for example, which 
can make a bad situation worse, as happened in the Swissair 
Flight 111 air accident [9]. Like aviation, HFT is really a 
system of systems, so there are potentially lessons to be 
learned at several levels. Below we highlight some of the 
lessons we have identified so far. 
Lessons from systems of systems 
In aviation the way that problems are dealt with requires 
decision making on several levels. The technology may 
decide that a faulty piece of equipment should be shut 
down, or the decision could be made by the pilots. The 
decision to allow an aircraft that has declared an emergency 
to land out of turn at an airport requires much more manual 
co-ordination and intervention between the flight crew and 
air traffic control. In HFT the decision to shut down a single 
system down after a failure could be taken automatically, 
but the decision to shut down one or more trading venues, 
or even close the markets should require some degree of 
manual control and co-ordination between traders, 
regulators and those operating the exchanges. Indeed, the 
SEC has recently called for the introduction of kill 
switches, which may reside at the exchanges, to instantly 
disable an errant trading system [8]. 
One of the reasons that air transport works on a global basis 
is because of bottlenecks in the system. Aircraft regularly 
fly through the airspace of many countries en route from 
one airport to another without incident. They have to safely 
end up at airports, however, and how they do so depends on 
co-operation and co-ordination between pilots, air traffic 
control, airlines and the regulators, including the 
independence of ATC from the airlines, and regulations that 
govern the vertical and horizontal separation of aircraft 
Even under free flight conditions, the aircraft still have to 
form an orderly queue as they approach an airport before 
they can land. In HFT, however, the traders are the people 
who oversee how trades progress, and have a vested interest 
in exploiting any anomalies they may spot. The speed of the 
trades makes it impossible for the traders to interact with 
the trading systems in real time. This means that the traders 
cannot detect a single failure until the effects have become 
large enough to be noticeable by a human. In the time it 
takes to diagnose and repair the failure, however, many 
more trades may have been executed, and possibly have 
exploited that failure. Haldane [19] suggests the possibility 
of imposing minimum resting periods on all trades, which 
would place a lower level time limit on each trade, and 
would reintroduce an element of collaboration and 
communication into the trading process. He argues that this 
would help restore the balance between market efficiency 
and market stability; to date regulatory changes have tended 
to favour market efficiency. 
Lessons from systems monitoring 
Part of the burden for handling some aspects of aviation 
safety and efficiency has been passed to the automation. 
The detection of other air traffic in the aircraft’s vicinity, 
for example, is nowadays handled by the aircraft’s Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System which automatically generates 
alarms on several levels. If technology is to provide at least 
part of the solution within HFT, however, it becomes even 
more important that any technology failures are 
immediately obvious to the traders and the markets as a 
whole. If a system is frequently generating alarms, for 
example, then the traders will become quite experienced at 
routinely handling them. This highlights Bainbridge’s final 
irony which is that the best automated systems which rarely 
require manual intervention require the biggest investment 
in training to ensure that the people can appropriately 
respond when things do go wrong. 
In air traffic control, the vigilance problem is dealt with by 
only allowing controllers to spend limited time at their 
displays overseeing a sector of airspace. Although this idea 
could be applied to HFT, it would not overcome the fact 
that the trades are happening at a rate faster that the traders 
can track. So they could only monitor trading at a higher 
level of abstraction. 
Accident investigation in aviation relies on forensic 
evidence from the aircraft’s cockpit voice, and flight data 
recorders. These are used to piece together what happened 
in the aftermath of the accident. Up until very recently the 
SEC simply did not have access to enough data to be able to 
forensically examine why crashes were happening in the 
market. They have now employed technology from one of 
the HFT firms to address this problem. Up until now, the 
SEC has relied on the official trading record, referred to as 
the consolidated tape, which details the prices of all trades 
made on any of the US’s stock exchanges. The 
sophisticated trading firms do not wait the extra 
milliseconds for the consolidated tape to be released but 
instead buy the data directly from the exchanges. This 
allows them to build their own record before the official 
record is released, and it is more comprehensive because it 
includes details of orders that were submitted but never 
completed. Even with the new stream of information from 
Tradeworx, however, the SEC will still not have a 
completely comprehensive picture of the market. For 
example, it will not have access to data for trades executed 
in dark pools—trading venues that do not require adherence 
to the reporting rules used by the public exchanges [32]. 
Furthermore, the details of who is placing the trades will 
only become available once the consolidated audit trail is 
introduced in the next few years. 
Lessons from regulation and standards 
The need for effective regulations and regulators is critical 
to aviation. The role of regulators like the Civil Aviation 
Authority in the UK, for example, includes explicit 
objectives addressing safety and efficiency. In HFT the role 
of the regulators like the SEC focuses on protecting 
investors, but without explicitly mentioning safety issues. 
Nanex Research [27] recently highlighted that the 
regulators appeared not to be enforcing Regulation National 
Market System (NMS) and subsequently suggested that 
rather than being enforced, it had been rescinded [30]. 
Regulation NMS covers the issue of the National Best Bid 
or Offer which is supposed to assure investors that they are 
getting the best price for any stocks they buy and sell. The 
emphasis on speed at all costs in automated trading has 
made it virtually impossible to show a definitive audit trail 
for whether an investor received the best price. The 
regulations also exist to prevent quotes being generated to 
manipulate other traders in the market—so called quote 
stuffing—but are not being applied. Nanex Research 
suggests that quotes should have a minimum lifespan of 
50ms.  
There are recognised standards for developing software for 
aviation. RTCA/DO-178B (version B) (also known as 
EUROCAE ED-12B), is the de facto standard used by 
regulators like the FAA to decide whether software will 
perform reliably in an airborne environment. This standard, 
which was published in 1992, provides guidelines for 
assuring that the software and equipment will perform its 
intended function with a level of safety that is compliant 
with airworthiness requirements. In HFT, the overall safety 
of the market has effectively been ignored, with traders 
switching from one algorithmic trader to another to exploit 
anomalies as they arise in the live market regardless of the 
effect they may have on that market. The SEC has recently 
called for new regulations on software testing and reliability 
after the Knight Capital fiasco, including new software 
standards [31].  
In aviation, there is often a long lead time between the 
conception of a piece of equipment and its being introduced 
into the industry and made mandatory. Rigorous testing and 
certification are required before the new equipment is 
deployed. S-mode datalink, for example, was originally 
conceived in 1975. It has only been mandatory for aircraft 
flying under visual flight rules in Europe since 2005, 
however [3]. In stark contrast, the lifetime of trading 
algorithms is very short, with traders typically introducing 
new algorithms every few weeks. A system of governance 
requiring evidence of testing, or a system of certification 
would help to regulate the appearance of rogue algorithmic 
traders in the markets. 
Lessons from organisational learning 
The aviation industry has generally been very good at 
managing the effects of the ongoing introduction of 
automation. Many of the important issues associated with 
glass cockpits in the mid 1990s were encapsulated by the 
FAA’s Human Factors team’s report, The interfaces 
between flightcrews and modern flightdeck systems [14], for 
example. Flight deck technology has evolved considerably 
in the intervening period, but the skills needed to deal with 
the changes in technology have not. At the same time 
manual skills have been eroded as the pilots rely 
increasingly on the technology to fly the aircraft, making it 
harder for pilots to know how to (and be able to) recover 
from a stall, and carry out a go-around in the event of a 
missed approach when coming into land. Even though 
regulations for recurrent training of pilots exist, there have 
been recent calls for changes to the recurrent training 
regulations in order to reconcile pilot skills with the newer 
technologies [25]. Manual control skills, such as being able 
to recover from a stall, and carrying out a go-around in the 
event of a missed approach are being eroded. These 
examples show that the regulators need to self-monitor, and 
regularly revisit the regulations to learn which ones are still 
applicable, and whether they are still being appropriately 
policed and enforced. 
In the aftermath of an aviation accident, there is invariably 
an accident investigation, carried out by an agency that is 
independent of the regulator. In the UK, for example, the 
Air Accident Investigation Board (part of the Department 
for Transport) would produce a report which it would send 
to the Civil Aviation Authority which regulates aviation and 
is a public company, rather than a government agency. The 
accident report produces clear and timely findings, 
identifying lessons that can be learned, and where changes 
may be needed to improve safety. In most cases there is 
general agreement with the findings, and where there is 
disagreement, it is often a matter of degree. In contrast, the 
CFTC/SEC report on the Flash Crash was widely 
condemned for being late and inaccurate. The SEC is now 
considering the need for external retrospective assessment. 
It has been noted that “[w]ithout some assessment … we 
may never know what went wrong—and we run the risk of 
trying to prevent the wrong problem” [21]. 
SUMMARY 
On the face of it, high frequency trading and aviation could 
hardly be more different. Both are striving to achieve 
resilience--in the markets, and in air transportation 
respectively-- whilst still allowing companies to make a 
profit. We have, however, identified several underlying 
similarities in the ways that HFT and aviation work. 
Up until the Flash Crash in 2010, HFT emphasised profits 
over resilience but since then there has been an increased 
focus on improving resilience. Based on the identified 
similarities between HFT and aviation we have highlighted 
several lessons where we believe that HFT can learn from 
aviation in the areas of technology, regulation and software 
development. We regard these lessons as the start of the 
process of improving resilience in the HFT markets (and 
potentially, beyond). Our intention is to build up a 
comprehensive list of lessons that can be used to improve 
and maintain the resilience in the HFT markets. 
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